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Power Preponderance, Institutional Homogeneity,  
and the Likelihood of Regional Integration
♣
 
Gaspare M. Genna
♦
 
Introduction  
 
What explains the variation of regional integration worldwide? The literature on regional 
integration is as old as the first attempts to establish the European Union (EU), but the attempt to 
develop generalized theories with systematic testing is relatively new. As the number of regional 
projects increases, and with the added complexity of overlapping memberships, we are faced with 
task of explaining and predicting these new movements of cross border cooperation. The project 
outlined in this paper attempts to continue the current trend of theory development and empirical 
analysis. After reviewing the range of theories, a central argument will be developed that will 
synthesize power transition and institutional theories of regional integration. Specifically, the 
likelihood of institutionalized regional integration increases under a power preponderance 
structural condition and high levels of trade which promote homogenization of domestic 
institutions. Increasing homogenization, in turn, promotes trade and integration.  
A common definition of regional integration states that it is a shifting of certain national 
activities toward a new center (Haas 1958). Integration therefore is a form of collective action 
among countries in order to obtain specific goals. These goals can be as grand as political 
unification (in the case of the EU) or a free trade area, as found in the North American Free Trade 
Association (NAFTA). Lindberg refines the definition by proposing that it is an “evolution over 
time of a collective decision making system among nations. If the collective arena becomes the 
focus of certain kinds of decision making activity, national actors will in that measure be 
constrained from independent action” (1970: 46). In economic terms it is “a series of voluntary 
decisions by previously sovereign states to remove barriers to the mutual exchange of goods, 
services, capital, or persons” (Smith 1993: 4). Also in the vein of economics, integration can also 
simply mean the degree of market merger among states. This refers to the amount of goods, 
services, capital, and labor flows among states. While this captures an essence of what is 
occurring, it misses the institutional aspect of integration which is central to its definition. The 
degree of market merger occurs because the states have negotiated an established practice of 
market flows and their regulation.  
For the purposes of this paper, the definition of integration will follow closely the definitions 
purposed by Hass and Lindberg. Regional integration
1 is the establishment of regular collective 
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  3decision making among states for the intention of establishing and regulating market flows. The 
degree of integration refers to the degree of collective decision making. At one end is an 
intergovernmental arrangement in which states make common decisions but are autonomous in 
regulating those decisions. If a regional authority does exist, it services at the pleasure of the 
individual states. On the opposite end is the supranational arrangement, in which regional 
institutions do exist and make decisions alongside intergovernmental arrangements or supersede 
the member-states’ authority.  
The rest of the paper examines the literature on regional integration with the aim of 
reviewing, critiquing, and synthesizing prior theories. The synthesis is the establishment of a 
general theory of regionalism. The subsequent sections will examine the method to test the key 
hypotheses using systematic measures of the variables and future direction of this proposed 
research.  
 
The Literature on Regional Integration 
 
Although the literature on regional integration has an extensive epistemology, general theories of 
regionalism are still at the early stages of development. In addition, most of the research is 
Eurocentric. Theories of regional integration can be roughly grouped into three perspectives: (1) 
neofunctionalism and institutionalism; (2) international power and security theories; and (3) 
domestic politics and intergovernmentalism.  
In the first group, neofunctionalism posits that regional integration arises due to increasing 
technological, economic, and other complexities and problems that states can no longer 
effectively solve unilaterally (Haas 1958; Mitrany 1975). According to this perspective, 
governments are likely to enter into cooperative arrangements in order to cope with various 
functional needs, such as the improvement of economic welfare for their citizens. Once the 
political elite establish a cooperative arrangement, the theory predicts that integration would 
become self-perpetuating through a “spillover” process (Haas 1958). Through this mechanism, 
success in one functional area increases demands for cooperative arrangements in other functional 
areas due to two reasons. First, demand would increase because successful integration in one area 
would gain supporters in other areas. Second, further integration in another area or areas would 
allow integration in the original area to fully succeed. While neofunctionalism was influential in 
the 1950s and 1960s, it has been criticized as being a post hoc theory having difficulties in 
generating testable hypotheses because many of the variables in question are not easily 
operationalized. Neofunctionalism also cannot predict a priori the issue-areas in which regional 
cooperation or integration occurs. In addition, functional needs do not necessarily predetermine 
the direction of change that states may choose to pursue (see Pentland 1973).  
Institutionalism, which emerged in the 1980s, inherited the thinking of the neofunctionalist 
school. Put simply, institutionalists argue that international institutions promote cooperation by 
helping states overcome collective action problems. By lengthening the shadow of the future and 
by increasing transparency and enforcement of cooperation, international institutions facilitate 
issue-linkages and strategies of reciprocity and make international commitments more credible 
(Axelrod and Keohane 1986; Martin 1992; Simmons 2000). Keohane (1984), for example, claims 
that it is possible to create and sustain, even after the decline of a hegemonic power, international 
regimes in order to cope with market failures, reduce transaction costs, and respond to other 
problems that are difficult to be managed at the national level. With respect to European 
integration, institutionalists have studied the impact of the European Union institutions on the 
decision-making process, such as the agenda-setting power of the European Parliament (Tsebelis 
1994; Garrett and Tsebelis 1996). Garrett and Weingast (1993) argue that institutions are not 
simply the facilitators of efficiency gains in the process of regional integration; they also provide 
                                                                                                                                                                             
1 The terms regionalism and regional integration will be used interchangeably in this paper.  
  4focal points—precedents and symbols around which actors’ behaviors converge—that help 
determine particular choices made at critical decision points.  
Institutionalism has stimulated important research on international cooperation and 
integration. However, applying this research to understand non-European regional integration has 
been limited. This dearth of research may be due to the weak supranational institutional 
developments outside Europe. Moreover, the degree of institutionalization itself is a variable that 
needs explication, but institutionalism, except for resorting to the functionalist argument of 
efficiency gains, has a difficulty explaining the emergence of supranational regional institutions. 
Furthermore, researchers have criticized institutionalism for its focus on absolute gains, 
neglecting the possibility of absolute losses (Oatley and Nabors 1998) and relative gains (Grieco 
1988).  
Another take on the institutional argument focuses on state level institutions and how 
variation in domestic institutions influences the degree of regionalism. Feng and Genna (2003) 
reexamine the concept of institutions. Instead of looking at the rules and pattern of organized 
governance, they examined the established set of preferences in key areas of liberalization: (1) 
money and inflation, (2) government operations and regulations, (3) takings and discriminatory 
taxation, and (4) international exchange. They find that the homogeneity of institutions among 
member-states not only facilitates integration, but that integration promotes greater homogeneity 
among members. This mutually reinforcing mechanism not only explains the level of integration 
in Latin America, Southeast Asia, and Europe, but also explains the varying pace of integration in 
each case.  
Power theories stress the distribution of power among states as a central factor influencing 
international outcomes. Among power theories, neorealism argues that the asymmetric gains from 
exchange tend to hinder international cooperation (Waltz 1979; Grieco 1988). However, many 
neorealists do not completely rule out such possibilities. For example, Gowa and Mansfield 
(1993), Gowa (1994), and Mansfield and Bronson (1997) argue that commercial liberalization is 
more likely among states that are political and military allies than among states that are actual or 
potential adversaries. They propose a defensive realist approach in which commercial 
liberalization strengthens mutual security among allies: states prefer to have strong allies and 
trade can aid in strengthening allies’ economies and thereby improving military capabilities. 
Grieco (1997) advanced a “relative disparity shift” hypothesis where a trend of shifting relative 
disparity in the capabilities of states within a region is likely to lead disadvantaged states to 
oppose the development of formal regional institutions while relative stability of capabilities 
tends to foster the establishment and deepening of such regional arrangements. Grieco’s study 
comparing relative capability change and the development of regional integration in Western 
Europe, East Asia, and the Americas largely supports his hypothesis.  
Hegemonic stability theory likewise emphasizes the importance of power for international 
political and economic outcomes. The early version of hegemonic stability theory concerned the 
rise and maintenance of the liberal international economic order (Krasner 1976; Gilpin 1987). 
Proponents of hegemonic stability theory argued that the presence of a hegemonic state (that is 
capable of and committed to promoting economic liberalism) was a necessary condition to sustain 
liberal international commerce. The erosion of hegemony, by contrast, tends to give rise to 
protectionism. In line with this argument, Gilpin (2001) recently advanced a thesis that the 
existence of one or more powerful states committed to integration is the key to the successful 
evolution of regional economic institutions.  
Like other power-centered theories, power transition theory focuses on the relative power of 
countries in the international system. However, power transition scholars differ from neorealists 
in important areas. First, power transition scholars do not assume an anarchic international system 
but assume a hierarchic order presided over by the preponderant power (Organski 1958; Organski 
and Kugler 1977, 1980; Tammen et al. 2000; see Lemke 1996, 2001 for application to local 
hierarchies). The preponderant power establishes a set of status quo arrangements with the help of 
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preponderant power; the larger the power of the state, the greater its capabilities and therefore the 
longer its territorial reach. A status quo arrangement is the set of conditions under which all states 
operate. One important example is the demarcation of territorial boundaries and border 
permeability. There theory stresses the satisfaction with the status quo relationship between dyads 
of countries and the dynamics of a power transition that occurs when a subordinate power 
approaches and exceeds the capabilities of the preponderant power. As applied to international 
conflict, power transition theory posits that conflict is likely to occur when the subordinate and 
preponderant powers are at near parity and are dissatisfied with the status quo relationship. In 
contrast, a peaceful transition occurs if both powers share compatible preferences and are 
therefore jointly satisfied with the status quo relationship. Efird and Genna (2002) extend the 
theory and argue that the development of regional integration after a power transition between 
two satisfied powers improves because the formerly less powerful country has a vital interest in 
not only maintaining but also furthering and institutionalizing the arrangements that it believes to 
have contributed to its rise.
2 Efird and Genna’s statistical test provides strong support for their 
hypothesis. Genna and Hiroi (2004; 2005; forthcoming) modified the theory by focusing in on the 
impact of trade dependence in one time period on the degree of integration at a subsequent time 
period. Explanatory power improved in the cases of Latin American integration by examining the 
satisfaction of trade dependence instead satisfaction with the status quo in general.  
The final group of regional economic integration research stresses the importance of domestic 
politics and intergovernmental bargaining. By “taking preferences seriously” (Moravcsik 1997), 
this literature emphasizes the distributional consequences of economic policies for domestic 
societal groups and the desire of political leaders to hold onto power. At its core, scholars 
working with this approach contend that governments’ economic policies are strongly influenced 
by distributional conflict among societal groups; that groups that expect to lose from integration 
will oppose it and those that anticipate to benefit from it will support it; and that economic 
policies often reflect the preferences of the more powerful and better organized interest groups in 
society (Frieden 1991, 1998; Milner 1988, 1997; Rogowski 1989; Moravcsik 1997).  
Interest group politics, however, is not the whole story. Politicians have their preferences and 
interests. This literature assumes that a politician’s desire to retain office is the crucial guiding 
principle of policy making. Moreover, domestic political institutions are argued to shape the 
patterns of interactions between domestic groups and whose interests will be represented in 
governments’ policies (Putnam 1988; Garrett and Lange 1995).  
Similarly, intergovernmentalism posits that economic interests are the driving forces of 
regional integration. Moravcsik (1998) argues that commercial interests of leading domestic 
producers, macroeconomic preferences of ruling governmental coalitions, bargaining among 
powerful national governments over the distributive and institutional issues account for the 
developments of European integration. Haggard (1997) generally agrees with Moravcsik’s thesis. 
Haggard (1997) contents that the more powerful states largely shaped the bargaining agendas of 
economic integration in Asia and the Western Hemisphere. However, the interests of weaker 
states also affect—although to a lesser degree—the regional economic agreements. What is 
crucial for economic integration to proceed, in Haggard’s view, is the convergence of preferences 
among parties to regional agreements that facilitate the bargaining and construction of regional 
economic blocs. He claims that the differences between the developments of East Asian and Latin 
American regional integration are due to the differences in the convergence or divergence of 
preferences of member countries about the direction and extent of economic integration.  
 
 
 
                                                           
2 See also Efird, Genna, and Kugler (2003).  
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The literature in total provides several important variables in developing a general theory of 
regionalism. First, the distribution of capabilities in regional systems matter. The empirical 
evidence shows that asymmetric distribution of power is a more favorable condition for this 
interdependence to develop. This is due to the ability of the preponderant power to coordinate 
efforts and distribute incentives to other members. Second, states do have a favorable interest to 
become economically interdependent. The central assumptions of neorealism lead us to believe 
that states prefer low to no levels of interdependence because their level of security diminishes. 
However, defensive realists agree that interdependence will occur among allies due to their need 
for mutual security. Hegemonic stability and power transition theories also agree that states do 
seek these benefits. Third, preferences are highly important. Being satisfied with prevailing 
conditions influences states to protect the status quo. By institutionalizing the status quo, states 
improve the certainty of a favorable future. Fourth, the link between regional level and domestic 
level politics helps explain the production of preferences. Preferences develop as a result of an 
aggregation of domestic desires. These desires spawn from competing groups that interact in the 
domestic arena, with the preferences of the more power groups being more likely to be expressed. 
Fifth, the homogeneity of institutional preferences lowers the costs of cooperation because states 
follow similar polices. States that wish to free ride on other states’ policies are not likely to be 
present thereby improving the certainty that distribution of benefits will be based on negotiated 
market interactions and not harmful unilateral state action. Sixth, the relationship between 
homogeneity and integration is reinforcing. As already stated, homogeneity of institutions 
increases the likelihood of regionalism. But the effect of increased regionalism also increases the 
likelihood of further homogeneity. Finally, a synthesis of the prior findings suggests that another 
feedback mechanism is present. As integration and homogeneity increases, then the level of 
satisfaction is likely to improve. This assumes that regionalism produces the benefits 
hypothesized by liberal economic theory (Krugman and Obstfeld 2002).  
Figure one maps out the causal pathways of regionalism given the reviewed research. The 
structural conditions for regionalism include the presence of a regional preponderant power and a 
satisfaction with trade dependence among potential or existing member-states (the status quo). 
The two variables interact since together they are a necessary and sufficient condition for 
integration. This set of conditions promotes greater institutional homogeneity. The preponderant 
power can lead in promoting similarities among institutionalized policies such as inflation targets, 
government regulations, taxation, and international exchange. Satisfaction among the relatively 
smaller powers gives the preferences of the preponderant power credence. The increased 
homogeneity increases the likelihood of creating or deepening integration. With homogeneity 
uncertainty and costs of integration are lowered, leading states to cooperate. Integration furthers 
the likelihood that homogeneity among the member-states will increase and thereby leading to 
further integration. As the reinforcement of homogeneity and integration continues this will 
feedback to the level of satisfaction with interdependence. If integration is successful in providing 
aggregate benefits, then satisfaction with interdependence will improve. This in turn interacts 
with the asymmetric power conditions and thereby further strengthens the homogeneity-
integration cycle. The likelihood that pathways will breakdown or slowdown increases during the 
relatively brief period of power transition. Since integration will spawn high levels of status quo 
satisfaction, integration will promote peaceful power transitions.  
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Homogen Integrati onderance*Status Quo
 
The entire pathway cannot be tested as a whole. Instead it can be deconstructed into various 
linear pathways: 
(Preponderance*Status Quo Satisfaction) → Homogeneity → Integration 
(Preponderance*Status Quo Satisfaction) → Integration → Homogeneity 
Homogeneity → Integration → Status Quo Satisfaction 
Integration → Homogeneity → Status Quo Satisfaction 
These pathways can be tested using the following equations: 
(1)  Integrationt+2=  α1 + β1Institutiont+1+  γ1Power Preponderancet + γ2 SQ Satisfactiont  + 
γ3(Power Preponderance*SQ Satisfaction)t+ εt+b 
(2)  Institutiont+3=  α2 + β2Integrationt+2+  γ1Power Preponderancet + γ2 SQ Satisfactiont  + 
γ3(Power Preponderance*SQ Satisfaction)t + εt+c 
(3) SQ Satisfactiont+4= α3 + β3Integrationt+2+ γ3Institutiont+1 + εt+d 
(4) SQ Satisfactiont+4= α4 + β4Integrationt+2+ γ4Institutiont+3 + εt+d 
 
 
Hypothesis Testing 
 
I test the hypotheses using the generalized least squares method. Since each of the dependent 
variables at time t will have a large correlation with the variables at time t + n, AR(1) 
autocorrelation is assumed to apply to each panel. Therefore the estimated coefficient of the 
AR(1) process is specific to each panel and not the entire data set. The unit of analysis is the non-
directed regional dyad from 1960-2000.
3 Regional dyads are countries that share a common 
border or separated by no more than 300 miles of water. Non-directed dyads best fit the present 
research because no theoretical assumption is made that country A would initiate integration with 
country B (or vise versa). It is assumed that regardless of identity of the initiator, regional 
integration is a negotiated process whose success is theoretically specified. Therefore including 
directed dyads will only produce redundancy in the data. I generated the list of dyads and some of 
the variables using EUGene software (Bennett and Stam 2000). The remainder of this section 
describes the variables used in the analysis.  
The operationalization of regionalism must include a systematic coding so that the analysis 
can distinguish varying levels while still comparing similar attributes. This is done by using a 
multidimensional measurement referred to as the integration achievement score (IAS), which was 
first developed by Hufbauer and Schott (1994) and latter refined and applied in Efird and Genna 
2002; Efird, Genna, and Kugler 2003; Feng and Genna 2003; and Genna and Hiroi 2004. The 
calculation of the IAS in Hufbauer and Schott’s work involves a smaller number of regional 
integration organizations for a single year, 1994. The updated score adds greater precision to their 
method, includes a greater number of regional integration projects, and involves an expanded 
timeframe. It gauges the level of regional integration by looking at six categories commonly 
attributable to regionalism: (1) trade in goods and services, (2) degree of capital mobility, (3) 
                                                           
3 Some dyads do not include all years due to a country’s independence after 1960 and missing data.  
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  8degree of labor mobility, (4) level of supranational institution importance, (5) degree of monetary 
policy coordination, and (6) degree of fiscal policy coordination. The coding system also breaks 
down the six categories into five levels along a Guttman scale (see appendix table one). The final 
measure is an average of the six categories allowing for an equal weight for each. The data used 
to estimate the IAS comes primarily from the Europa World Year Book and cross-referenced with 
other specialized sources. Of the various macro-geographic regions, the level of integration in 
Africa is the lowest. Levels of Asian and North and South American integration are higher than 
those in Africa, with the highest levels found in Europe. Currently, the score is being updated to 
include all cases of regional integration registered with the World Trade Organization from 
inception to 2003. The final data will be used in the subsequent versions of this paper.  
Power preponderance is relatively simple to operationalize. The formula is the natural log of 
the absolute difference (plus one) of the dyad: 
Power Preponderance = ln (|GDPi – GDPj| + 1) 
The GDP data come from the World Development Indicators (2005) and are in constant US 
dollars.
4
I operationalize satisfaction with the status quo through the use of mutual trade interests 
(MTI). MTI is the ratio of the total value of exports among the country dyads to total dyadic 
output:  
∑
∑ =
GDP
Exports
MTI  
Exports are used instead of total trade (imports plus exports) to prevent double counting. Also, it 
is less likely for states to misrepresent their export values relative to import values. A ratio of 
total output is needed so as to determine the level of trade dependence among the member-states. 
The trade values come from Gleditsch 2002 (a revision of the International Monetary Fund 
direction of trade statistics) and are in millions of US dollars. Since the ratios are small, each MTI 
value is multiplied by one million to improve interpretation of the results. MTI outperforms other 
traditional measures of status quo satisfaction (similar alliance portfolios or UN voting records) 
when examining regional integration (Genna and Hiroi 2004).  
Institutional homogeneity is determined by using the democracy scores of the Polity IV data 
set (Marshall and Jaggers 2005). Each country’s democracy score is an index of four authority 
dimensions: competitiveness of executive recruitment, openness of executive recruitment, 
executive constraints, and competitiveness of political participation (Gleditich and Ward 1997). I 
measure the degree of homogeneity by taking the absolute different of each country’s democracy 
score and dividing by ten. This produces values between zero and one, with lower values 
indicating higher levels of homogeneity.  
 
Preliminary Findings 
 
Table one displays the estimations of equations one through four. Overall, the results are as 
expected with the partial exception of estimations three and four; estimations one and two are 
completely within expectations. The first model demonstrates that power preponderance and 
mutual trade interest at time t and institutional homogeneity at time t+1 are good predictors of the 
level of regional integration at t+2. The greater the power asymmetry and the higher the mutual 
trade interest, the higher the level of regional integration. Figure two, parts a and b, displays the 
conditional effects of the interaction term. The black line segment represents the portion of the 
conditionality that remains significant at the p≤.10 level, while the dashed line segment represents 
the portion that is not significant. Figure two-a depicts the conditional coefficients of power 
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  9preponderance at varying levels of MTI. As the level of MTI increases, the preponderance 
coefficients become increasingly positive. Figure two-b indicates a similar relationship. As the 
level of power asymmetry increases, the coefficient of MTI increases. For example, when the 
value of preponderance is 1 or near parity, the coefficient of MTI is -14.07. This means that a 
one-point increase in the MTI value decreases the level of integration in terms of IAS by about 
14. However, when preponderance is 29, then the MTI coefficient is 5.73 (i.e., a one-point 
increase of MTI increases the IAS by about 6). Between approximately 19 and 21 on the values 
of preponderance, the MTI coefficients are not significant, meaning that the trade in this range 
does not significantly influence the level of integration. Institutional homogeneity’s negative 
coefficient indicates that the more homogeneous the political institutions are at t+1, the higher the 
level of integration. The second model indicates that higher levels of power asymmetry and 
mutual trade interests, the more homogeneous the institutions among the regional dyads. Recall 
that lower levels of the homogeneity measure translates to higher levels of homogeneity. Figure 
three a and b displays the graphical interpretation of the preponderance-MTI interaction term. 
Figure three-a shows that as MTI increases, the preponderance coefficient becomes increasingly 
negative. The exception of this relationship is at the lower end of MTI’s values. Figure three-b 
also demonstrates a similar relationship, except for preponderance levels between 23 and 27. The 
higher the level of integration at a one year lag also produces higher levels of homogeneity. The 
two models together indicate that preponderance and mutual trade interests precede homogeneity 
and integration. The estimations also indicate that homogeneity and integration are mutually 
reinforcing.  
The second set of estimations (three and four) in table one only partially confirms 
expectations. The level of integration at t+2 is associated with the level of mutual trade interests 
at t+4 and leads to the conclusion that higher levels of institutionalized integration produces 
greater mutual trade interests. However greater institutional homogeneity does not seem to 
influence the levels of MTI. Given the reinforcing nature of institutional integration and 
homogeneity, perhaps only one of these variables can account for the variation in mutual trade 
interests.  
 
Conclusions: Next Steps in the Research Project 
 
The work thus far has introduced a general theory of regionalism and some preliminary results. 
The results show some promise in supporting the theory but greater testing rigor is needed. We do 
see a pathway of conditions that estimates the level of integration around the world. Power 
asymmetry and status quo satisfaction in terms of MTI are the precursors to greater institutional 
homogeneity and institutionalized integration. Integration and homogeneity are also reinforcing 
factors. Integration does improve status quo satisfaction. An overall system develops that 
improves integration. The limiting factor, so far, is the level of power asymmetry. When power 
among the dyads is more evenly distributed, the system brakes down and integration is limited.  
The following are the next steps in this project. All involve improving the testing rigor. First, 
the data on integration needs to be expanded. While the current data is a representative cross-
section of integration on each of the continents (except Antarctica), it is not complete. There are a 
number of integration projects (mainly in Africa and Asia) that need to be included. This will 
require coding of these projects and merging the data into the current data set. Second, an array of 
institutional homogeneity needs to be tabulated. While the current measure taps into the degree of 
political institutional homogeneity, economic institutions should also be included (Feng and 
Genna 2003; Souva 2004). This will include various indicators such as money and inflation, 
government operations and regulations, takings and discriminatory taxation, and international 
exchange. Other economic institutional variables can include such things as property rights. 
Political institutions can also be expanded to include electoral rules and influence of pressure 
groups such as trade unions and the military. Third, the unit of analysis can also include the cases 
 10of integration, alongside the current regional dyads. This will require reformulation of the 
independent variables. The parallel testing of dyads and regional groups may be helpful in 
unveiling potential biases of power asymmetries. Currently the dyadic method allows for a pair-
wise analysis of all regional members, but may under- or over-report the influence of the larger 
country vis-à-vis all other members. Fourth, the method of estimation needs improvement. The 
GLS method is appropriate for the first cut, but a method of simultaneous equation analysis is 
needed either through a three stage method or perhaps the Markov Chain method. Finally, a set of 
control variables may be necessary in order to compare future results with possible alternatives to 
the theory.  
 11Table One: Generalized Least Squares Autocorrelation Corrected Regressions 
        
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Dependent Variables  IAS (t+2)  Institutional 
Homogeneity 
(t+1) 
Mutual Trade 
Interest (t+4) 
Mutual Trade 
Interest (t+4) 
Power Preponderance (t)  0.011*** 
(0.0027) 
0.009*** 
(0.002) 
  
Mutual Trade Interest (t)  -14.78*** 
(3.20) 
8.28*** 
(3.11) 
  
Power Preponderance · 
Mutual Trade Interest (t) 
0.71*** 
(0.14) 
-0.341*** 
(0.137) 
  
Institutional Homogeneity 
(t+1) 
-0.018* 
(0.010) 
 -.00001 
(.0003) 
 
Institutional Homogeneity 
(t+3) 
    -0.0004 
(.0003) 
IAS (t+2)    -0.054*** 
(0.007) 
0.002*** 
(0.0003) 
0.003*** 
(0.0003) 
Constant -0.068 
(0.061) 
0.042 
(0.049) 
.005*** 
(.0003) 
0.004*** 
(0.0003) 
Observations 10435  10435  10117  10117 
Number of dyad  432  432  436  436 
χ
2 115.87*** 80.92***  79.40***  83.28*** 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 12Figure Two: Graphical depiction of conditional coefficients  
for the GLS regression model one 
(a) Conditional coefficients of power preponderance at varying levels of MTI 
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(b) Conditional coefficients of MTI at varying levels of preponderance 
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 13Figure three: Graphical depiction of conditional coefficients  
for the GLS regression model two 
(a) Conditional coefficients of power preponderance at varying levels of MTI 
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(b) Conditional coefficients of MTI at varying levels of preponderance 
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 14Appendix 
 
Table A-one: Integration Achievement Score (coding system) 
1.  Trade in Goods and Services 
0 = No agreements made to lower tariffs and non-tariff barriers 
1 = Preferential Trade Agreement 
2 = Partial Free Trade Area 
3 = Full Free Trade Area 
4 = Customs Union 
5 = No barriers among member countries 
2.  Degree of Capital Mobility 
0 = No agreements made to promote capital mobility 
1 = Foreign Direct Investment allowed in limited form 
2 = Capital withdrawal allowed 
3 = Full access for foreign investment and capital withdrawal, except for national government 
procurement 
4 = Full capital mobility expect for large scale merges and acquisitions 
5 = Full capital mobility without restriction 
3.  Degree of Labor Mobility 
0 = No agreements made to promote labor mobility 
1 = Right of movement granted for select professions 
2 = Full right of movement 
3 = Transferability of professional qualifications granted 
4 = Transferability of pensions and other retirement devices 
5 = Full freedom of movement 
4.  Level of Supranational Institution Importance 
0 = No supranational institutions 
1 = Establishment of nominal institutions 
2 = Information gathering and advisory role 
3 = Ability for institutions to amend proposals 
4 = Ability for institutions to veto proposals 
5 = Supranational institutions operate as primary decision node 
5.  Degree of Monetary Policy Coordination 
0 = No monetary policy coordination 
1 = Consultation regarding policy 
2 = Commitment to maintain parity  
3 = Coordinated interventions 
4 = Regional Central Bank establishment 
5 = Single currency 
6.  Degree of Fiscal Policy Coordination 
0 = No fiscal policy coordination 
1 = Consultation regarding policy 
2 = Commitments regarding deficit spending and taxation 
3 = Sanctions regarding breaking commitments 
4 = Uniform tax code 
5 = Single budget 
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